

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

POK 23-9 BOL

GP 31/45

43-42

Action
ARA

RR RULPAL RUEKDA
DE RUA
LZ 009A 0752315

1967 MAR 17 AM 7 57

017238

Info
SS
GPN
SP
SC
SAM
L
H
IC
P

USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
AODA
ICA
AID
FC
E
IC
GDP

ZNY CCCCC
R 162245Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUESAS/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUESUA/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEKM/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RULPAL/USCINCSO
RUEKDA/DIA
STATE GRNC
BT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 2-27-87
() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY in PART
() DEDY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)

TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

LA PAZ 2314

SUBJECT: REPORTED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA.

1. AT URGENT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS, I CALLED ON HIM AT HIS HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND DEFAIT TO FIND HIM IN A MEETING WITH ACTING CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES GENERAL BELMONTE; ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL LAFUENTE; ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL VASQUEZ; AND AIDES.

2. BARRIENTOS SAID BOLIVIAN AUTHORITIES YESTERDAY

PAGE 2 RUESLZ 2314
MORNING PICKED UP TWO GUERRILLA SUSPECTS (VINCENTE ROCAPADO TERRAZAS AND PASTOR BARRERA QUINTEL) NEAR IPITA, DEPARTMENT OF SANTA CRUZ, COORDINATES APPROXIMATELY 19 DEGREES, 40 MINUTES SOUTH AND 63 DEGREES, 32 MINUTES WEST.

3. UNDER INTERROGATION IN LA PAZ TODAY, SUSPECTS REPORTEDLY ADMITTED ASSOCIATION WITH GROUP OF GUERRILLAS NUMBERING 30 TO 40 IN REGION SURROUNDING IPITA, PUNING ROUGHLY FROM MONTEAGUDO AND LAGUNILLAS IN THE SOUTH TO VALLE GRANDE IN THE NORTH. THEY REPORTEDLY SAID GROUP WAS LED BY CASTROITE CUBANS AND INCLUDED PERUVIANS, ARGENTINES AND PERHAPS OTHER FOREIGNERS. SUSPECTS REPORTEDLY INDEPENDENTLY IDENTIFIED AS ALSO INVOLVED WITH GUERRILLAS MOISES GUEVARA, AND PERSON KNOWN AS "CHINO", ALSO RECENTLY REPORTED FROM HERE.

Classification Review By [Signature]

() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DEDY
() Non-responsive info.
FOI Exemptions ()

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPEALS REVIEW PANEL, DATE 8 MAY 87
() RELEASE () DENY
() Non-responsive info.
FOI Exemptions ()

BIA5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3- LA PAZ 2314, MARCH 17

9. BARRIENTOS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM US IN FOLLOWING RESPECTS:

JAM PROVISION OF RADIO LOCATING EQUIPMENT AND NECESSARY TECHNICAL BACK-UP TO ENABLE GOB TO PIN-POINT REPORTED GUERRILLA RADIO TRANSmitters.

5. ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED BY FIELD FORCES OPERATING THERE.

12. BARRIENTOS SAID HE THOUGHT SECURITY FORCES IN PARAGUAY AND ARGENTINA SHOULD KNOW OF THE FOREGOING IN THE EVENT THE REPORTED GUERRILLAS ARE FORCED OUT AND CREE IN THEIR DIRECTION. HE ASKED OUR COOPERATION

PAGE 5 RUESLZ 2314 [REDACTED]
TION IN TRANSMITTING THIS MESSAGE.

1. I MADE NO COMMITMENTS BEYOND A PROMISE TO LOOK INTO WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO.

12. WE ARE TAKING THIS REPORT OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY WITH SOME RESERVE, BUT SEE NO HARM IN EMBASSIES ASUNCION AND BUENOS AIRES PASSING MESSAGE MENTIONED PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE, AT THEIR DISCRETION.

13. MEANWHILE WE ARE SEEING WHAT WE CAN DO LOGICALLY ABOUT PROVIDING RADIO LOCATER EQUIPMENT BEFORE CALLING FOR FURTHER USG HELP IN THIS REGARD.

GP-3. HENDERSON

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- LA PAZ 2314, MARCH 17

~~INVOLVED~~ IN GUERRILLA PREPARATIONS.

X BIA5

4. SUSPECTS REPORTEDLY MENTIONED CHE GUEVARA AS LEADER OF B&D, BUT ADMITTED THEY HAD NEVER SEEN HIM, AND WE (INCLUDING BARRIENTOS) DULY DOUBTFUL OF THIS. SUSPECTS REPORTEDLY SAID GUERRILLAS HAD "AMPLE" BUT OTHERWISE

PAGE 3 RUZSLZ 314 [REDACTED]
UNSPECIFIED QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF ARMS; AND HAD "AMPLE" FUNDS. SUSPECTS WERE IN FACT PICKED UP AFTER AROUSING SUSPICIONS OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF UNDULY GENEROUS OFFERS THEY WERE MAKING FOR FOOD SUPPLIES. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEIR DETENTION MAY HAVE BEEN HOWEVER THEIR SALE OF A 22 CALIBER RIFLE.

5. THERE HAS BEEN NO ARMED OR OTHER TYPE OF CONTACT IN AREA WITH THE REPORTED GUERRILLAS, ALTHOUGH TWO SQUADS OF BOLIVIAN ARVETROOPS ARE REPORTEDLY TRAILING ONE HALF DAY BEHIND ELEMENTS OF THEM THROUGH VERY DIFFICULT TERRAIN.

6. BARRIENTOS AND HIS SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS APPEARED PREPARED TO BELIEVE THERE WAS SOME KIND OF GUERRILLA PREPARATION IN THE AREA AND ASSERTED AS A FACT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF GUERRILLA RADIO TRANSMITTERS SENDING CODED SIGNALS WITHIN THE REGION.

7. BARRIENTOS SAID HE BELIEVED THE GUERRILLAS' PURPOSE WAS TO DIVERT BOLIVIAN MILITARY FORCES TO THIS REMOTE, DENSELY COVERED AND MILITARILY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TERRAIN, LEAVING VITAL CENTERS SUCH AS

PAGE 4 RUZSLZ 2314 [REDACTED]
LA PAZ, COCHABAMBA, ORURO, AND THE MINES WITH REDUCED PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE ACTION IN THOSE PLACES.

8. BARRIENTOS SAID HE WOULD NOT FALL IN ANY SUCH TRAP BUT PLANS TO PUT SECURITY FORCES IN KEY CENTERS ON EXTRA ALERT AND SEND SMALL SPECIALLY QUALIFIED FORCES INTO THE REPORTED GUERRILLA AREA TO "BOX THEM IN".

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Department of State

F760023-1947

Pol 23-9 Bel

EXCISE TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E186

PAGE 2: LA PAZ 00513 050211Z

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/27/76

PER H. Ryan OFFICE ARA

FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-B-143

89

ACTION ARA 19

INFO USIE 00, SSR 01, SP 02, SS 35, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, P 04,

CIA 04, NSAE 00, INR 07, AID 30, EUR 25, NIC 01, PC 04, SAH 03, L 03,

H 02, /155 W

P R 041920Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2866
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 113
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 44
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 203
AMEMBASSY LIMA 323
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 96
AMEMBASSY PARIS 36
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO 175
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 172
AMCONSUL COCHABAMBA UNN
USCINCSO
DOD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ACR

REVIEWED by Jh DATE 2-27-76
() DECLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DECLASSIFY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
J. Moskowitz TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as CONFIDENTIAL, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () G, OADR

9003572

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LA PAZ 513

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

PAGE 2 RUESLZHNGYIA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: GUERRILLAS

REF: LA PAZ 506

1. PRESENCIA SEPT. 3 CARRIED STORY SANTA CRUZ

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL



F762223-1948

Department of State

UNTELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 00513 050211Z

CORRESPONDENT EDWIN CHACON, WHO INTERVIEWED GUERRILLA JOSE CARILLO, SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AND CAPTURED AUG. 31 CLASH. CHACON QUOTED CARILLO AS SAYING QUOTE DEBRAY WAS IN NANCAHUAZU, CARRYING ARMS AND NEARLY ALWAYS WITH THE GUEVARA AND THE CUBANS UNQUOTE. CARRILLO ALSO SAID DEBRAY GAVE LECTURES LP GUERRILLAS BUT HE (CARRILLO) WAS ON GUARD DUTY AND DID NOT HEAR THEM. CARRILLO ALSO REPORTED AS SAYING (A) HE MET GUEVARA WEARING SPARSE JARD IN NANCAHUAZU DURING FIRST WEEK JANUARY, (B) GUEVARA PARTICIPATED ATTACK ON SAMAIPIATA AND LEFT ARE SEVERAL DAYS LATER WITH FIVE UNIDENTIFIED

PAGE 3 RUESLZ 038A [REDACTED]
CUBANS, (C) TANIA WAS WITH GUERRILLA GROUP FROM BEGINNING AND WAS VERY VALIANT, (D) HE, CARRILLO, WAS MEMBER COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION ORURO AND UNEMPLOYED SINCE 1964, JOINED GUERRILLA GROUP NANCAHUAZU JAN. THIS YEAR WITH TEN OTHER BOLIVIANS, MET FORTY MORE AT CAMP WHERE RECEIVED ARMS TRAINING, AND LATER FOUGHT WITH VARIOUS GROUPS.

2: COMMUNIQUE RELEASED LAST NIGHT INDICATED NEW FIRE. FIGHT OCCURRED SEPT. 3 BETWEEN GUERRILLA FRACTION AND ELEMENTS FOURTH DIVISION AT PALMARITO. ONE GUERRILLA KILLED AND BODY TRANSPORTED CAMIRI FOR IDENTIFICATION. DEFATT CONFIRMS AND STATES NO BAF CASUALTIES.

3 PRESS REPORTS ANOTHER GUERRILLA FRACTION CONTACTED MORNING SEPT. 3 BY EIGHTH DIVISION UNIT AT MASICURI BAJO (VADO DE PESOL) SHORT DISTANCE FROM SITE AUGUST 31 CLASH. PRESENCIA CLAIMS FIREFIGHT FOLLOWED THOUGH NO DETAILS YET AVAILABLE. NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION.

PAGE 4 RI SLZ 038A [REDACTED]

4: ARMY COMMANDER LA FUENTE ANNOUNCED MILITARY

UNCLASSIFIED~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

TELEGRAM

F760223-1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 00513 050211Z

PATROLS ARE SEARCHING RIO GRANDE FOR BODIES TANIA AND NEGRO, ALLEGEDLY KILLED AUGUST 31. HOWEVER, ARMY G-3 INFORMS DEFATT SINCE BODIES NOT YET RECOVERED IT IS NOW BELIEVED THEY MAY ALREADY ESCAPED.

5. COMMENT: [] CORRECT NAME PRISONER IS JOSE CASTILLO CHAVEZ (AKA PACO) AND JOINED GUERRILLAS FEB. NOT JAN. AS REPORTED PRESS. HENDERSON

BIA5

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
10		
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	
OSD	USIA	NSA
33		3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UPGRADE TO CONF CASE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

EXCISE

7-260003-1952

REC-23-6 BOL
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

CAS 21
A-85
NO.
(with Unclassified Enclosures)
TO : Department of State
INFO: USCINCSO, DIA

FROM : Amembassy LA PAZ
SUBJECT: Press Article on Che Guevara
REF DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/27/76
PER H. Ryan OFFICE ARA
FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-B-143

Following is an informal translation of an article written by Humberto VACAFLOR Ganam, which appeared in the September 13 issue of the La Paz daily Presencia, entitled, "Che Guevara in Bolivia." The article is believed to be substantially accurate, [] states that Guevara probably entered Bolivia by plane, traveling directly to La Paz, in November 1966, and not by crossing the frontier with Brazil at Corumba in January 1967, as stated in the article.

Vacaflor is an enterprising journalist and apparently obtained some of the information from Bolivian Armed Forces (BAF) sources. Since this article appeared (although apparently for different reasons), the BAF has revoked Vacaflor's press credentials to enter the operational zone, including Camiri.

HENDERSON

Enclosure: Informal Translation of Vacaflor article

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

27 SEP 22 PM 1967

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

Drafted by: POL:JTHackett:f:9-15-67

Clearances: POL:CWGrever

Contents and Classification Approved by DCM:JFisher

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by Date 8-27-91

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () DELETE
Non-responsive info.

() CLASSIFY as CONFIDENTIAL
() DOWNGRADE to () Sec () C, OADR

1967 SEP 21 PM 5 11

COPYFLO-PBR

9003572

9003572



Department of ~~EXCISE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 F760223-1922

Pol 23-7 Bal
 6 Cuba
TELEGRAM

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 00826 091939Z

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 2/27/76
 PER NRyan OFFICE ARA
 FADRC FOI CASE NO. 5-B-143

48

ACT:ON ARA 19

INFO SSO 00,USIE 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,SP 02,SS 35,GPM 03,SC 0,NSC 00

RSC 01,L 03,H 02,SAH 03,EUR 25,P 04,INR 07,CIA 04,NSAE 00,NIC 01

ACDA 17,RSR 01,138 W

O R 091915Z OCT 67
 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3085
 INFO DOD
 DIA
 USCINCSO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED by V DATE 2-27-91
☐ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY in PART
☐ DEL-XY ☐ Non-responsive info.
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
S. Moskowitz TS authority to:
☐ CLASSIFY as CONFIDENTIAL OADR
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C, OADR

~~SECRET~~ LA PAZ 826

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

SUBJECT: CHE GUEVARA

1: ACCORDING [] CHE GUEVARA TAKEN
 PRISONER BY BOLIVIAN ARMY UNITS IN HIGUERAS AREA SOUTHWEST
 OF VILLAGRANDE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 8.

2: GUEVARA RELIABLY REPORTED STILL ALIVE WITH LEG WOUND
 IN CUSTODY BOLIVIAN TROOPS IN HIGUERAS MORNING OCTOBER 9.

PAGE 2 RUESLZ 099A ~~SECRET~~
 BOLIVIAN ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL DAVID LAFUENTE DEPARTED
 LA PAZ FOR GUERRILLA ZONE MORNING OCTOBER 9, PRESUMABLY
 TO VERIFY FIRST HAND IDENTITY OF GUEVARA.

GP-4 HENDERSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

See Log 826
 10/9/67

9003572

BIAS

2

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

RECEIVED
N.S.C.

Oct 13 9 13 AM '67

Intelligence

Note

October 12, 1967

314
SANDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
KINSBURGH
MARTIN
MCCARTHY
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

Wait - 97

in good

file

on

SAUNDERS

TAYLOR

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: Guevara's Death--The Meaning for Latin America

"Che" Guevara's death was a crippling--perhaps fatal--blow to the Bolivian guerrilla movement and may prove a serious setback for Fidel Castro's hopes to foment violent revolution in "all or almost all" Latin American countries. Those Communists and others who might have been prepared to initiate Cuban-style guerrilla warfare will be discouraged, at least for a time, by the defeat of the foremost tactician of the Cuban revolutionary strategy at the hands of one of the weakest armies in the hemisphere. However, there is little likelihood that Castro and his followers throughout Latin America will cease their efforts to foment and support insurgency, albeit perhaps with some tactical modifications.

The mystery of Guevara. Argentine-born Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Fidel Castro's righthand man and chief lieutenant in the Sierra Maestra, author of a book on guerrilla tactics, one-time president of Cuba's National Bank under Castro and later Minister of Industries, mysteriously disappeared in March 1965. Rumor said that he was ill, or that he had been put to death by Castro, or that he was in the Dominican Republic during its civil war or in Vietnam or in the Congo. In October 1965, Castro finally announced that Guevara had renounced his Cuban citizenship and set off to devote his services to the revolutionary cause in other lands. Rumors as to his whereabouts continued, but until recently there was no substantial evidence to prove even that he was alive.

Guevarismo makes a strong comeback. The March 1965 disappearance of Guevara

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, aside from normal administrative exchange with other agencies at the working level. It has not been disseminated elsewhere.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

91-30

DATE FOR NARA DATE 5-20-91

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPY 123 LIBRARY

- 2 -

occurred during a period when Fidel Castro was toning down his emphasis on violent revolution and trying to compose his differences with the traditional pro-Soviet communist parties in Latin America. But it was not long before Castro again began to favor openly the independent revolutionary theory which he and Guevara had developed based on their view of the Cuban revolution. Since the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966, Castro has advocated with increasing stridency the thesis which is set forth most clearly in a book entitled Revolution within the Revolution? by Castro's principal theoretical apologist, French Marxist intellectual Jules Regis Debray (now on trial in Bolivia). Disgusted with the "peaceful path-to-power" arguments of the Latin American old-line communist parties--especially the Venezuelan CP--and their Soviet supporters, Fidel and Debray have asserted that Latin America is ripe for insurgency now and have specified that the ruralguerrilla movement rather than any urban-based communist party or other group must be the focal point and the headquarters of the insurgency. They have declared that action must take precedence over ideology and that the guerrilla movement--as the nucleus of a Marxist-Leninist party--will create the objective conditions for its ultimate success and attract the local peasantry.

On April 17 this year Cuban media gave great play to an article supposedly written by Guevara reiterating the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis. Two days later Fidel praised the article and eulogized Guevara, eliminating any lingering impression that the romantic "Che" had been removed from the Cuban pantheon.

LASO Conference highlights disagreement of orthodox communists. The first Latin American Solidarity Organization meeting in Havana this summer served to underscore disagreement with the Castro thesis by the old line communist parties.

They argue that conditions for violent revolution exist only in very few Latin American countries at present and that the local communist parties—not Cubans or other foreigners—should be the only ones to determine in accordance with traditional Marxist theory what tactics are called for. Despite an outward show of harmony among the delegates, the LASO conference, of which Guevara was named honorary president in absentia, widened the breach between the pro-Moscow communists and those who want revolution now.

Bolivia: testing ground for the theory? The guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia which came to light in March 1967 rekindled international interest in Latin American insurgencies and especially in the movements then underway in Latin America. The Guatemalan guerrillas seemed to be on the ropes; guerrilla forces in Venezuela and Colombia were making no headway. The new Bolivian insurgency, on the other hand, seemed to be the most promising. In an effort to maintain unity with Castro and within the Latin American extreme left, even traditional communist parties agreed to endorse the Bolivian guerrillas. Interest was further heightened when in April Debray himself was captured by the Bolivian armed forces and he indicated that Che Guevara had organized and was leading the guerrillas.

Initial battles between the guerrillas and the Bolivian army last March and April proved almost disastrous to the poorly trained, ill-equipped troops who suffered heavy losses in every encounter. The failure of the army to deal effectively with ^a handful of insurrectionists shook the entire Bolivian government and led to desperate appeals for US assistance. Neighboring countries began to consider what action might be required by them. But the guerrillas proved neither invincible nor infallible. By July, aided by testimony from Debray and other captives who were

members of the guerrilla force or had contact with it, as well as by peasants who demonstrated more loyalty to the armed forces than to the guerrillas despite the latter's efforts to woo them, Bolivian army units were able to inflict some damage on the guerrillas albeit with fairly heavy casualties. In late August, a significant victory took place when the guerrilla rear guard was wiped out in a well-executed ambush. Still, a successful encounter with the main body of the guerrilla force did not occur until October 8, when the army recouped its reputation by the action which resulted in the death of Guevara.

Effects in Bolivia. Guevara's death is a feather in the cap of Bolivian President Rene Barrientos. It may signal the end of the guerrilla movement as a threat to stability. If so, the Bolivian military, which is a major element of Barrientos' support, will enjoy a sense of self-confidence and strength that it has long lacked. However, victory could also stir political ambitions among army officers who were directly involved in the anti-guerrilla campaign and who may now see themselves as the saviors of the republic.

Castro's reaction: public rededication and private reassessment. Cuban domestic media have thus far limited their reporting on Guevara's death to mentioning "insistent statements" to this effect in the international press which Cuban authorities can neither confirm or deny. However, the broad outlines of Havana's public position are generally predictable. Guevara will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death. His exemplary conduct will be contrasted to the do-nothing, cowardly theorizing of the old line communist parties and other "pseudo-revolutionaries" in Latin America and elsewhere. The Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis will be upheld as still valid and the protracted nature of the struggle will

- 5 -

be emphasized. Blame for Guevara's death will be attributed to the usual villains-- US imperialism, the Green Berets, the CIA--with only passing contemptuous reference to the Bolivian "lackeys". A call will no doubt be made for new "Che's" to pick up the banner of the fallen leader and optimistic predictions will be made as to the inevitability of the final triumph.

In private, however, Castro and his associates will have to reappraise the prospects for exported revolution. Castro might up his commitment of Cuban men and resources to foreign insurgency in order to demonstrate that the death of one combatant--even ^{the} illustrious "Che"--makes little difference to the eventual success of guerrilla struggle in the hemisphere. Such response would fit with Castro's characteristic refusal to accept failure in a major undertaking. Or he might curtail Cuba's efforts to foster insurgency abroad, pending further assessment and stocktaking on the prospects for potential and existing insurgencies. Or, on analyzing the Guevara effort in Bolivia, he might adopt some new tactical approaches for guerrilla movements. On balance, it seems most likely that he will continue to commit about the same level of resources as at present to promising revolutionaries while utilizing the memory of the "martyred" Guevara and perhaps some tactical changes in approach.

Probable Latin American reaction to Guevara's death. News of Guevara's death will relieve most non-leftist Latin Americans who feared that sooner or later he might foment insurgencies in their countries. The demise of the most glamorous and reputedly effective revolutionary may even cause some Latin Americans to downgrade the seriousness of insurgency and the social factors which breed it. On the other hand, communists of whatever stripe and other leftists are likely to

eulogize the revolutionary martyr--especially for his contribution to the Cuban revolution--and to maintain that revolutions will continue until their causes are eradicated.

If the Bolivian guerrilla movement is soon eliminated as a serious subversive threat, the death of Guevara will have even more important repercussions among Latin American communists. The dominant-peaceful line groups, who were either in total disagreement with Castro or paid only lip-service to the guerrilla struggle, will be able to argue with more authority against the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis. They can point out that even a movement led by the foremost revolutionary tactician, in a country which apparently provided conditions suitable for revolution, had failed. While these parties are unlikely/^{entirely} to denigrate Che's importance and abilities, they will be able to accuse the Cubans of adventurism and point out that the presence of so many Cubans and other foreigners among the leaders of the Bolivian guerrillas tended to alienate the peasants upon whose support they ultimately depended. They will be able to argue that any insurgency must be indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are ripe for revolution. Castro certainly will not be able to disassociate himself from Guevara's Bolivian efforts and will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from the old line parties. Although leftist groups which may have marginally accepted the Cuban theory probably will reevaluate their policies, Castro's spell on the more youthful leftist elements in the hemisphere will not be broken.

AIRGRAM

E262
F760003-1872
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-128

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 01/20/76

TO : Department of State

PER H. Ryan OFFICE ARA

DEPT. PASS: ASUNCION, BUENOS AIRES, BRASILIA, LIMA, MONTEVIDEO,
RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO, BIA, USCINCSO

OSD

FROM : Amembassy LA PAZ

DATE: October 18, 1967

SUBJECT: Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara

REF

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED: On October 16, 1967, the High Command of the Bolivian Armed Forces released the following communique, together with three annexes, on the death of Che Guevara:

"1. In accordance with information provided for national and international opinion, based on documents released by the Military High Command on October 9 and subsequently, concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, as a result of which he, among others, lost his life, the following is established:

a) Ernesto Guevara fell into the hands of our troops gravely wounded and in full use of his mental faculties. After the combat ended, he was transferred to the town of La Higuera, more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8, where he died as a result of his wounds. His body was transferred to the city of Vallegrande at 4 p.m. on Monday, October 9, in a helicopter of the Bolivian Air Force.

b) Two medical doctors, Dr. Moises Abraham Baptista and Dr. Jose Maria Cazo, director and intern respectively of the

Enclosures: 5

1. Annex 1 (Death Certificate)
2. Annex 2 (Autopsy Report)
3. Annex 3 (Argentine Police Report)
4. Communique of Argentine Embassy
5. Spanish texts of above (clippings)

FORM 4-62 DS-323

LIMITED UNCLASSIFIED USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☐ In ☐ Out

JCS by:

POL: CWGrover, JThackett, RPKing, AGEdelman

DCM: JWFisher

POL: CWGrover

DEPARTMENT OF STATE/DCOAS

REVIEWED BY

Date 2-27-91

() RELEASE () UNCLASSIFIED
() EXTEND () DECLASSIFY IN PAK
() REPLY () DELETE

No response info.

NO. EO 12958 PA 000000
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE to () Sec () C, OADR

DECLASSIFIED

F760003-1873

LA PAZ A-128

UNCLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

Knights of Malta hospital, certified the death (Annex No. 1) and recorded the autopsy ordered by the military authorities of Vallegrande (Annex No. 2).

c) With regard to the identification of the deceased and the authentication of the diary that belonged to him, the government requested the cooperation of Argentine technical organizations, which sent three experts, one handwriting specialist and two fingerprint specialists, who verified the identity of the remains and certified that the handwriting of the campaign diary, captured by our troops, coincides with that of Ernesto Guevara (Annex No. 3).

d) The campaign diary and the book of doctrine (libro de concepciones) are documents that contain an account of activities, from the date of his entry (into the guerrilla area) until October 7, and (justify) the judgments that this chief of subversion, the members of the guerrilla bands, and the people, both in this country and abroad, who collaborated with them, deserved. As a consequence, they are documents exclusively for the use of the military.

2. By this means the Military High Command considers complete all information relating to the death of Che Guevara. La Paz, October 16, 1967." END UNCLASSIFIED.

BEGIN CLASSIFIED. Comment: The reports provide further documentary proof that the guerrilla chieftain, who was reportedly fatally injured in battle against the Bolivian Armed Forces on October 8, was indeed Ernesto Che Guevara. The documents do little, however, to resolve public speculation on the timing and manner of death. It will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death (the examining physicians are said to have told journalists that Guevara died a few hours before their examination late in the afternoon of October 9). Moreover, the communique also leaves unsaid the time of death, indicating simply that it occurred sometime between 8 p.m. October 8, and the transfer of the body to Vallegrande at 4 p.m. the following afternoon. This would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours. Some early reports last week also indicated that Guevara was captured with minor injuries while later statements, including the attached autopsy report, affirm that he suffered multiple and serious bullet wounds.

LIMITED ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
OFFICIAL USE

REF ID: A66003-1874
DECLASSIFIED

LA PAZ A-128

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

3

We doubt that the communique will satisfactorily answer these questions and are inclined to agree with the comment by Presencia columnist Politicos that these discrepancies, now that the identity of the body is generally accepted, are "going to be the new focus of polemics in the coming days, especially abroad." END CLASSIFIED.

HENDERSON

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

760003-1875

E262A

R

UNCLASSIFIED

Pg. 1 of Enclosure to
LA PAZ A-128

Annex No. 1 - Death Certificate

The death certificate signed October 10, 1967, by Drs. Moises ABRAHAM Baptista and Jose MARTINEZ Cazo, Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, indicates that on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived DOA an individual who military authorities said was Ernesto GUEVARA Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body.

Annex No. 2 - Autopsy Report

The autopsy report signed October 10, 1967 by Drs. ABRAHAM Baptista and MARTINEZ Cazo, indicates that the body recognized as that of Ernesto Guevara was 40 years of age, white race, approximately 1.73 meters in height, brown curly hair, heavy curly beard and mustache, heavy eyebrows, straight nose, thin lips, mouth open, teeth in good order with nicotine stains, lower left pre-molar floating, light blue eyes, regular physique, scar along almost whole left side of back. A general examination showed the following wounds:

1. Bullet wound in left clavicular region egressing through shoulder blade.
2. Bullet wound in right clavicular region fracturing same, without egress.
3. Bullet wound in right side, without egress.
4. Two bullet wounds in left side, with egress through back.
5. Bullet wound in left pectoral between 9th and 10th ribs, with egress on left side.
6. Bullet wound in lower third part of right thigh.
7. Bullet wound in lower third part of left thigh in seton.
8. Bullet wound in lower right forearm with fractured ulva.

The thorax cavity when opened showed that the first wound lightly injured the apex of the left lung.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE/DC/DCMR

UNCLASSIFIED
(1) DECLASSIFY
(1) EXEMPT
(1) EASY
(1) DECLASSIFY IN PART
(1) DELETE
NATIONAL SECURITY

REVIEWED BY

UNCLASSIFIED

2-27-91

REVIEWED BY
(1) CL-SECRET
(1) CL-SECRET
(1) CL-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
F760203-1876

Pg. 2 of Enclosure to
LA PAZ A-128

UNCLASSIFIED

The second injured the sub-clavicle vessel, the bullet lodging itself in the second vertebra.

The third transversed the right lung lodging itself in the 9th rib.

The left lung was slightly damaged by bullet no. 4.

Wound no. 5 transversed the left lung in a tangential trajectory.

Thorax cavities, especially the right, presented abundant blood collection.

The opened abdomen showed no traumatic lesion, only expansion due to gases and citric liquid.

The cause of death was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging.

Annex No. 3 - Argentine Police Report

On Saturday, October 14, 1967, three officials of the Argentine Federal Police (Investigations), one a handwriting expert and the other two fingerprint experts, at the request of the Bolivian Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to collaborate in a matter of identification. They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution, apparently formaldehyde.

The fingerprint experts tried the "Juan Vucetich" system used in Argentina of making papillary sketches of the fingers, but the liquid caused the fingertips to wrinkle making tracing impossible. They then proceeded to take fingerprint impressions on polyethylene sheets and in some cases on pieces of latex, these to be sent to the Identification Department of the Argentine Police for further examination.

The experts then compared the fingerprints with the copy of the prints made from Guevara's Argentine identity record No. 3.524.272, establishing beyond doubt that both prints were from the same person. Also checked were prints taken from Guevara at Vallegrande on October 9, with the same result.

The handwriting expert then examined two notebooks in good condition. The title page of one read "1967" and its reverse "Carl

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

F760903-1877

Pg. 3 of Enclosure to
LA PAZ A-128

UNCLASSIFIED

Klippel - Kaiserstrasse 75 - Frankfurt a.M. and "Herstellung
Baier & Schosider - Neillbreum A.N." This book shows hand-
writing beginning under the date of January 1, 1967 and contin-
uing until October 7, 1967. Considering the period of the
writing, the writing itself, and the "signatures," the expert
decided they were suitable for formal extrinsic and intrinsic
comparisons in the handwriting identification system. The
expert also examined statistically the handwriting character-
istics of the notebook inscribed "Elba 66509" containing 44
pages of handwriting. There was sufficient regularity of
characteristics to determine that they were the same as those
reproduced in ^{Guevara's Argentine} identity record. Copies of the material will
be forwarded to the Argentine Police for further study.

Signed by Esteban Belzhauser and Juan Carlos Delgado.

Enclosure No. 4

COMMUNIQUE OF THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY AT LA PAZ

The technical commission detailed by the Argentine Govern-
ment at the request of the Bolivian Government to prove the
identity of the remains of Ernesto Guevara has proceeded to make
a comparison of the items that were provided by the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces with those that were in the hands of
Argentine police authorities. From the fingerprint and hand-
writing skill practiced by the technicians, in accordance with
scientific procedures currently in use, it develops that the
items compared correspond in an irrefutable manner to Ernesto
Guevara, thereby agreeing with the report issued by the Bolivian
authorities.

La Paz, October 16, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED